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Despite the fact that many of MacCormick's arguments have been
published previously, there is significant novel content in Rhetoric and the
Rule of Law. Most importantly, MacCormick abandons the position that he
espoused earlier in his career, retreating from Humean non-cognitivism and
aligning himself closer to Ronald Dworkin, whose theory of legal reasoning
significantly influences MacCormick. Another interesting aspect of this
book, then, is MacCormick's reflection on his past work in legal philosophy
and his response to those critical of his position.
COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING BANKRUPTCY COURTS. BY LYNN M. LOPUCKI.
MICHIGAN: MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2005. Pp. 322. Index,
references, glossary. USD $27.95 cloth.
BY EVAN VANDYK
In Courting Failure, Lynn M. LoPucki demonstrates how the
process of competing for large-and lucrative-bankruptcy cases is
corrupting America's bankruptcy courts. Although bankruptcy law is
federally regulated and the laws applied by courts across the country are the
same, LoPucki identifies several differences between jurisdictions attracting
the bankruptcy filings of large corporations and those that have not seen
these cases. These differences, as noted by LoPucki, shift bankruptcy
regulation to the benefit of those in case-placing positions (managers and
their lawyers), often to the detriment of creditors.
Bankruptcy professionals often justify this process by pointing to the
speed and flexibility offered by the bankruptcy courts in Delaware and New
York, arguing that the efficiency of their process is attracting cases.
However, LoPucki outlines several more insidious effects of the
competition, including: escalation of professional fees approved by the
courts; rubber-stamping of pre-packaged restructuring plans; increasing
priority of critical vendors over other unsecured creditors; undervalued
selling of companies by managers for personal profit; and retention of
control by the managers who oversaw the decline of the companies (and
often, awards of large retention bonuses to these same failed managers).
These changes favour case-placers while harming creditors, who have little
opportunity to influence the choice of venue.
LoPucki also demonstrates that the competition is reducing the
effectiveness of the bankruptcy process: a study of the post-restructuring fate
of bankruptcies filed between 1983 and 1996 demonstrates that New York
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and Delaware had re-filing rates three times higher than those in the rest of
the country.
In closing, LoPucki argues that recent progress in the international
harmonization of bankruptcy rules are in danger of encouraging a similar
process of competition on a worldwide scale. This process would be far
more damaging than the American competition; rather than involving
different (and sometimes creative) application of the same substantive
bankruptcy rules, countries would compete by reforming their rules to meet
the demands of case-placers.
